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Buffett’s Letters To Berkshire Shareholders 1977	巴菲特致股东的信 1977 年
Operating earnings in 1977 of $21,904,000, or $22.54 per share, were moderately better than anticipated a year ago. Of these earnings, $1.43 per share resulted from substantial realized capital gains by Blue Chip Stamps which, to the extent of our proportional interest in that company, are included in our operating earnings figure. Capital gains or losses realized directly by Berkshire Hathaway Inc. or its insurance subsidiaries are not included in our calculation of operating earnings. While too much attention should not be paid to the figure for any single year, over the longer term the record regarding aggregate capital gains or losses obviously is of significance.	1977 年本公司的营业净利为2,190 万 美元，每股约当22.54 美元，表现较 年前的预期稍微好一点，在这些盈余 中，每股有1.43 美元的盈余，系蓝筹 邮票大量实现的资本利得，本公司依 照投资比例认列投资收益所贡献，至 于伯克希尔本身及其保险子公司已实 现的资本利得或损失，则不列入营业 利益计算，建议大家不必太在意单一 期间的盈余数字，因为长期累积的资 本利得或损失才是真正的重点所在。
Textile operations came in well below forecast, while the results of the Illinois National Bank as well as the operating earnings attributable to our equity interest in Blue Chip Stamps were about as anticipated. However, insurance operations, led again by the truly outstanding results of Phil Liesche’s managerial group at National Indemnity Company, were even better than our optimistic expectations.	纺织事业的表现远低于预估，至于伊 利诺国家银行的成绩以及蓝筹邮票贡 献给我们的投资利益则大致如预期， 另外，由Phil Liesche 领导的国家产 险保险业务的表现甚至比我们当初最 乐观的期望还要好。
Most companies define “record” earnings as a new high in earnings per share. Since businesses customarily add from year to year to their equity base, we find nothing particularly noteworthy in a management performance combining, say, a 10% increase in equity capital and a 5% increase in earnings per share. After all, even a totally dormant savings account will produce steadily rising interest earnings each year because of compounding.	通常公司会宣称每股盈余又创下历史 新高，然而由于公司的资本会随着盈 余的累积扩增，所以我们并不认为这 样的经营表现有什么大不了的，比如 说每年股本扩充10%或是每股盈余成 长5%等等，毕竟就算是静止不动的定 存帐户，由于复利的关系每年都可稳 定地产生同样的效果。
Except for special cases (for example, companies with unusual debt-equity ratios or those with important assets carried at unrealistic balance sheet values), we believe a more appropriate measure of managerial economic performance to be return on equity capital. In 1977 our operating earnings on beginning equity capital amounted to 19%, slightly better than last year and above both our own long-term average and that of American industry in aggregate. But, while our operating earnings per share were up 37% from the year before, our beginning capital was up 24%, making the	除非是特殊的情况(比如说负债比例 特别高或是帐上持有重大资产未予重 估)，否则我们认为 “股东权益报酬 率”应该是衡量管理当局表现比较合 理的指针，1997 年我们期初股东权益 的报酬率约为19%，这比去年同期稍 微好一点，但远高于本身过去长期以 及当年美国企业整体的平均数，所以 虽然我们每股的盈余成长了37%，但 由于期初的资本也增加了34%，这使 得我们实际的表现并没有想象中那么

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gain in earnings per share considerably less impressive 好。 than it might appear at first glance. We expect difficulty in matching our 1977 rate of return 我们预期未来年度将很难再达到 during the forthcoming year. Beginning equity capital 1977 年这样的报酬率水准，一方面是 is up 23% from a year ago, and we expect the trend of 因为期初资本又增加了23%，一方面 insurance underwriting profit margins to turn down well 我们预期保险核保利润率会在年底以 before the end of the year. Nevertheless, we expect a 前开始反转，尽管如此，大家还是可 reasonably good year and our present estimate, subject 以期待丰收的一年，而我们现在的估 to the usual caveats regarding the frailties of 计是，虽然预测有其先天上的限制， forecasts, is that operating earnings will improve 我认为每股营业利益在1978 年应该 somewhat on a per share basis during 1978. 还有些许成长的空间。 Textile Operations 纺织事业 The textile business again had a very poor year in 1977. 1977 年纺织事业的表现依旧低迷不 We have mistakenly predicted better results in each of 振，过去两年我们乐观的预期纷纷落 the last two years. This may say something about our 空，这或许也说明了我们预测能力的 forecasting abilities, the nature of the textile 薄弱，或是纺织产业的本质，尽管一 industry, or both. Despite strenuous efforts, problems 再地努力与挣扎，行销与制造的问题 in marketing and manufacturing have persisted. Many 依旧存在，虽然市场上面临的困境与 difficulties experienced in the marketing area are due 产业情势相关，但也有不少问题是我 primarily to industry conditions, but some of the 们自己造成。 problems have been of our own making. A few shareholders have questioned the wisdom of 部份股东开始质疑我们是否应该继续 remaining in the textile business which, over the longer 留在纺织产业，虽然就长期而言其投 term, is unlikely to produce returns on capital 资报酬率明显低于其它的投资，但我 comparable to those available in many other businesses. 们的理由有以下几个：(1)我们在纽贝 Our reasons are several: (1) Our mills in both New 福及Manchester 的工厂都是当地最 Bedford and Manchester are among the largest employers 大的聘雇业者，员工的年龄偏高，缺 in each town, utilizing a labor force of high average 乏转换工作的能力，同时我们的员工 age possessing relatively non-transferable skills. Our 及其公会也已经尽其所能地与经营阶 workers and unions have exhibited unusual understanding 层配合努力改善成本结构及产品组 and effort in cooperating with management to achieve a 合，以使我们的经营得以维持下去(2) cost structure and product mix which might allow us to 管理阶层也相当努力同时坦承面对产 maintain a viable operation. (2) Management also has 业的问题，尤其是在1965 年经营权易 been energetic and straightforward in its approach to 主后，Ken Chace 依然尽力尽力地协 our textile problems. In particular, Ken Chace’s 助我们把纺织部门产生稳定的资金流 efforts after the change in corporate control took place 入转到获利更加的保险事业投资与购 in 1965 generated capital from the textile division 并之上(3)努力工作加上对制造与行 needed to finance the acquisition and expansion of our 销组合的乐观预期，我们的纺织事业 profitable insurance operation. (3) With hard work and 在未来看起来应该可以维持一个起码 some imagination regarding manufacturing and marketing 的利润空间。 configurations, it seems reasonable that at least modest profits in the textile division can be achieved in the future. Insurance Underwriting 保险事业

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Our insurance operation continued to grow significantly in 1977. It was early in 1967 that we made our entry into this industry through the purchase of National Indemnity Company and National Fire and Marine Insurance Company (sister companies) for approximately $8.6 million. In that year their premium volume amounted to $22 million. In 1977 our aggregate insurance premium volume was $151 million. No additional shares of Berkshire Hathaway stock have been issued to achieve any of this growth. Rather, this almost 600% increase has been achieved through large gains in National Indemnity’s traditional liability areas plus the starting of new companies (Cornhusker Casualty Company in 1970, Lakeland Fire and Casualty Company in 1971, Texas United Insurance Company in 1972, The Insurance Company of Iowa in 1973, and Kansas Fire and Casualty Company in late 1977), the purchase for cash of other insurance companies (Home and Automobile Insurance Company in 1971, Kerkling Reinsurance Corporation, now named Central Fire and Casualty Company, in 1976, and Cypress Insurance Company at yearend 1977), and finally through the marketing of additional products, most significantly reinsurance, within the National Indemnity Company corporate structure. In aggregate, the insurance business has worked out very well. But it hasn’t been a one-way street. Some major mistakes have been made during the decade, both in products and personnel. We experienced significant problems from (1) a surety operation initiated in 1969, (2) the 1973 expansion of Home and Automobile’s urban auto marketing into the Miami, Florida area, (3) a still unresolved aviation “fronting” arrangement, and (4) our Worker’s Compensation operation in California, which we believe retains an interesting potential upon completion of a reorganization now in progress. It is comforting to be in a business where some mistakes can be made and yet a quite satisfactory overall performance can be achieved. In a sense, this is the opposite case from our textile business where even very good management probably can average only modest results. One of the lessons your management has learned - and, unfortunately, sometimes re-learned - is the importance of being in businesses where tailwinds prevail rather

我们的保险事业在1977 年持续大幅 地成长，早在1967 年我们以860 万美 元购并国家产险及国家海上火险公司 (两者为姊妹公司)的方式进军保险 业，当年他们的保费收入大约为 2,200 万美元，时至今日，1977 年的 累积年保费收入已达1.51 亿美元，必 须强调的是，在此期间，伯克希尔没 有再发行过任何一股新股以支应成 长。

相反地，这600%的成长几乎都是来自 于国家产险本身的传统业务的稳定成 长再加上新创立的公司(包含1970 年 的Cornhusker 产险、1971 年的 Lakeland 火险、1972 年的德州联合保 险、1973 年的爱荷华保险及1977 年 的堪萨斯火险公司等)，以购并方式买 下的(1971 年的家庭与汽车保险、 1976 年现已更名为中央火险的 Kerkling 再保险以及1977 年的赛普 路斯保险公司)，以及最后透过行销新 业务-主要以国家保险名下进行的再 保险业务所得。

总的来说，保险事业的表现还算不错， 但情况并非全然如此，过去十年来， 我们也犯过一些大错，不论是在产品 或是人员方面，比如说我们在以下方 面就曾遇到重大的困难：(1)1969 年 推出的保证责任险(2)1973 年扩充佛 罗里达迈阿密地区的家庭及汽车保险 业务(3)目前尚未解决的航空”前 置”安排(4)我们在加州的劳工退休 金业务，我们相信这业务一旦改组完 成应该还是相当有潜力。保险这行业 虽然小错不断，但大致上还是可以获 得不错的成果，就某些方面而言，这 情况与纺织业刚好完全相反，管理阶 层相当优秀，但却只能获得微薄的利 润，各位的管理阶层所学到的一课， 很不幸一再学到的就是，选择顺风而 非逆风产业环境的重要性。

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than headwinds.
In 1977 the winds in insurance underwriting were squarely behind us. Very large rate increases were effected throughout the industry in 1976 to offset the disastrous underwriting results of 1974 and 1975. But, because insurance policies typically are written for one-year periods, with pricing mistakes capable of correction only upon renewal, it was 1977 before the full impact was felt upon earnings of those earlier rate increases. The pendulum now is beginning to swing the other way. We estimate that costs involved in the insurance areas in which we operate rise at close to 1% per month. This is due to continuous monetary inflation affecting the cost of repairing humans and property, as well as “social inflation”, a broadening definition by society and juries of what is covered by insurance policies. Unless rates rise at a comparable 1% per month, underwriting profits must shrink. Recently the pace of rate increases has slowed dramatically, and it is our expectation that underwriting margins generally will be declining by the second half of the year.	1977 年保险业核保的顺风不断地从 后方吹来，保费大幅度的调整在1976 年正式生效后，适时地抵消1974 年及 1975 年惨痛的核保记录，而由于保单 的签订通常以一年为期，所以定价的 修正通常必须等到换新约时，所以实 际上费率的上涨一直等到1977 年才 充分反应在盈余之上。 可惜的是钟摆再度开始摆荡到另一方 向，我们预估保险理赔成本以每个月 1%的幅度增加，主要的原因除了持续 性的通货膨胀使得修复人体及财产的 成本不停上涨，另一方面社会通膨， 亦即社会及陪审团对于保单理赔范围 不断扩大解释的倾向，因此除非费率 每个月也能同步上涨1%，否则核保利 益肯定会缩水，只是最近保费调涨的 速度明显趋缓，所以我们预期下半年 的核保利润空间将大幅缩减。
We must again give credit to Phil Liesche, greatly assisted by Roland Miller in Underwriting and Bill Lyons in Claims, for an extraordinary underwriting achievement in National Indemnity’s traditional auto and general liability business during 1977. Large volume gains have been accompanied by excellent underwriting margins following contraction or withdrawal by many competitors in the wake of the 1974-75 crisis period. These conditions will reverse before long. In the meantime, National Indemnity’s underwriting profitability has increased dramatically and, in addition, large sums have been made available for investment. As markets loosen and rates become inadequate, we again will face the challenge of philosophically accepting reduced volume. Unusual managerial discipline will be required, as it runs counter to normal institutional behavior to let the other fellow take away business - even at foolish prices.	讲到这里，我们必须再度将殊荣归予 Phil Liesche，在核保部门Roland Miller 以及理赔部门Bill Lyons 的 大力协助下，国家产险1977 年在传统 的汽车及责任险业务方面又大放异 彩，保费收入不但大幅成长，相较于 其它同业不堪1974-75 年的危机陆续 退出市场，其优异的核保利益更属难 得，国家产险的核保利益大幅地成长， 此外可供投资的资金亦迅速累积，只 可惜这样的情况维持不了多久，这些 业者又会再度卷土重来，随着市场紧 绷情势转为宽松，费率又将变得失控， 届时我们又必须回复过去冷静地接受 保费收入锐减的考验，严格的核保纪 律绝对必须维持，如此我们才能抗拒 直觉，眼睁睁地看着其它业者以疯狂 的价格抢走生意。
Our reinsurance department, managed by George Young, improved its underwriting performance during 1977. Although the combined ratio (see definition on page 12)	1977 年由George Young 管理的再保 险部门改善了其核保的绩效，虽然高 达107.1 的综合比率不算理想(相关

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of 107.1 was unsatisfactory, its trend was downward throughout the year. In addition, reinsurance generates unusually high funds for investment as a percentage of premium volume.	定义请参阅第12 页)，但至少趋势是 向下，此外再保险的保费收入依然贡 献大量的资金以供我们进行投资。
At Home and Auto, John Seward continued to make progress on all fronts. John was a battlefield promotion several years ago when Home and Auto’s underwriting was awash in red ink and the company faced possible extinction. Under his management it currently is sound, profitable, and growing.	至于John Seward 领导的家庭与汽车 保险在各个方面都有重大进展，几年 前当该公司因核保大幅亏损，面临倒 闭危机时，John 跳上火线，在他的管 理之下，公司的营运渐上轨道。
John Ringwalt’s homestate operation now consists of five companies, with Kansas Fire and Casualty Company becoming operational late in 1977 under the direction of Floyd Taylor. The homestate companies had net premium volume of $23 million, up from $5.5 million just three years ago. All four companies that operated throughout the year achieved combined ratios below 100, with Cornhusker Casualty Company, at 93.8, the leader. In addition to actively supervising the other four homestate operations, John Ringwalt manages the operations of Cornhusker which has recorded combined ratios below 100 in six of its seven full years of existence and, from a standing start in 1970, has grown to be one of the leading insurance companies operating in Nebraska utilizing the conventional independent agency system. Lakeland Fire and Casualty Company, managed by Jim Stodolka, was the winner of the Chairman’s Cup in 1977 for achieving the lowest loss ratio among the homestate companies. All in all, the homestate operation continues to make excellent progress.	John Ringwalt 负责的Homestate 业 务旗下主要包含五家公司，其中堪萨 斯火险在Floyd Taylor 筹备下于 1977 年底正式营运，Homestate 1977 年的保费净收入达到2,300 万美元， 三年前不过只有550 万美元，其余四 家的年度综合比率都低于100，其中 Cornhusker 甚至只有93.8，John 在 努力管理其它四家公司的同时，更让 Cornhusker 过去七年有六年的综合 比率低于100，从1970 年正式营运以 来，该公司已顺利成为内布拉斯加州 传统独立经纪系统的领导业者，至于 由Jim Stodolka 带领的Lakeland 火 险则荣获1977 年主席杯的头衔，因为 去年该公司的综合比率最低，总的来 说，Homestate 集团的营运在去年大 有进展。
The newest addition to our insurance group is Cypress Insurance Company of South Pasadena, California. This Worker’s Compensation insurer was purchased for cash in the final days of 1977 and, therefore, its approximate $12.5 million of volume for that year was not included in our results. Cypress and National Indemnity’s present California Worker’s Compensation operation will not be combined, but will operate independently utilizing somewhat different marketing strategies. Milt Thornton, President of Cypress since 1968, runs a first-class operation for policyholders, agents, employees and owners alike. We look forward to working with him.	我们旗下保险事业最新加入的成员是 位于加州的赛普路斯保险，至于劳工 退休金保险则因为是在1977 年底以 现金买下，所以其1,250 万美元的保 费收入并未列入我们当年的营运记 录，赛普路斯与国家产险现有的劳工 退休金保险业务不会合并，而会采用 不同的行销策略各自独立经营，赛普 路斯现任总裁Milt Thornton，在保 户、业务员、员工及股东方面的营运 管理皆属一流，对于能与他一起共事， 我们相当期待。

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Insurance companies offer standardized policies which 保险公司提供的制式保单很容易为其 can be copied by anyone. Their only products are 它同业所模仿，他们唯一的产品就是 promises. It is not difficult to be licensed, and rates 承诺，保险执照不难取得，而费率也 are an open book. There are no important advantages from 是公开的，这行业商标、专利、地点、 trademarks, patents, location, corporate longevity, 企业年资、原物料等都不重要，消费 raw material sources, etc., and very little consumer 者对于产品也很难产生特别的偏好， differentiation to produce insulation from 在企业的年报中，常常看到有人强调 competition. It is commonplace, in corporate annual 自己不同于其它同业的特殊之处，有 reports, to stress the difference that people make. 时这样的说法有道理，有时没什么道 Sometimes this is true and sometimes it isn’t. But 理，但不可否认的是，保险事业的本 there is no question that the nature of the insurance 质使得经理人的表现，对于公司绩效 business magnifies the effect which individual managers 的影响具有举足轻重的地位，很幸运 have on company performance. We are very fortunate to 的是与我们共事的是一群优秀的经理 have the group of managers that are associated with us. 人。 Insurance Investments 保险事业的投资 During the past two years insurance investments at cost 过去两年我们保险事业投入的资金成 (excluding the investment in our affiliate, Blue Chip 本(扣除对关系企业蓝筹邮票的投资) Stamps) have grown from $134.6 million to $252.8 已从原先的1.346 亿美元成长到 million. Growth in insurance reserves, produced by our 2.528 亿美元，保险准备的成长，主 large gain in premium volume, plus retained earnings, 要是由于保费收入的大幅增加，加上 have accounted for this increase in marketable 保留的盈余，是我们投资部位之所以 securities. In turn, net investment income of the 大幅增加的原因，也因此，我们整体 Insurance Group has improved from $8.4 million pre-tax 保险事业因为投资而增加的净收益也 in 1975 to $12.3 million pre-tax in 1977. 由1975年税前840万美元的利益成长 到1977 年的1,230 万美元。 In addition to this income from dividends and interest, 除了股利与利息收入之外，我们还实 we realized capital gains of $6.9 million before tax, 现了税前690 万美元的资本利得，四 about one-quarter from bonds and the balance from 分之一来自债券，剩下的则来自股票， stocks. Our unrealized gain in stocks at yearend 1977 至于1977 年年底未实现的资本利得 was approximately $74 million but this figure, like any 大约在7,400 万美元之谱，对于这个 other figure of a single date (we had an unrealized loss 数字，就像任何单一日期的数字， of $17 million at the end of 1974), should not be taken (1974 年底帐上有1,700 万美元的未 too seriously. Most of our large stock positions are 实现损失)大家不必看得太认真，因为 going to be held for many years and the scorecard on our 我们持股部位比较大的投资，往往要 investment decisions will be provided by business 持有很长一段时间，所以我们的投资 results over that period, and not by prices on any given 绩效依据的是这些被投资公司在这段 day. Just as it would be foolish to focus unduly on 期间的经营表现，而不是特定时期的 short-term prospects when acquiring an entire company, 股票价格，就像我们认为买下一家公 we think it equally unsound to become mesmerized by 司却只关心他的短期状况是件很傻的 prospective near term earnings or recent trends in 事，同样地持有公司部份所有权-也就 earnings when purchasing small pieces of a company; 是股票，我们认为只关心短期盈余或 i.e., marketable common stocks. 者是盈余短暂的变动也不应该。 A little digression illustrating this point may be 离题一下，有一点很有趣足以说明上 interesting. Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates and 述情况，伯克希尔纺纱与Hathaway

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Hathaway Manufacturing were merged in 1955 to form 工业是在1955 年合并成为伯克希尔 Berkshire Hathaway Inc. In 1948, on a pro forma combined Hathaway 公司的，再将时间往回推到 basis, they had earnings after tax of almost $18 million 1948 年，在拟制合并的基础下，当年 and employed 10,000 people at a dozen large mills 他们合计税前盈余达到1,800 万美 throughout New England. In the business world of that 元，旗下拥有十个遍布新英格兰地区 period they were an economic powerhouse. For example, 的工厂，员工人数一万人，在当时的 in that same year earnings of IBM were $28 million (now 环境，他们算是经济成长的重要动力 $2.7 billion), Safeway Stores, $10 million, Minnesota 之一，因为IBM 在同一年度的盈余也 Mining, $13 million, and Time, Inc., $9 million. But, 不过2,800 万美元(现在的年获利达 in the decade following the 1955 merger aggregate sales 到27 亿美元)，另外Safeway 商店 of $595 million produced an aggregate loss for Berkshire 1,000 万、3M 只有1,300 万而时代杂 Hathaway of $10 million. By 1964 the operation had been 志则为900 万，然而在双方合并后的 reduced to two mills and net worth had shrunk to $22 十年内，累计营收虽然有5.95 亿，但 million, from $53 million at the time of the merger. So 结算亏损却达到1,000 万美元，时至 much for single year snapshots as adequate portrayals 1964 年，公司的营运仅剩两家工厂， of a business. 净值更从合并时的5,300 万美元大幅 缩减至2,200 万美元，所以我们可以 这样说，单一年度所透露出公司营运 的景况实在是极其有限。 We select our marketable equity securities in much the 我们投资股票的选择方式与买进整家 same way we would evaluate a business for acquisition 企业的模式很相近，我们想要的企业 in its entirety. We want the business to be (1) one that 必须是(1)我们可以了解的行业(2)具 we can understand, (2) with favorable long-term 有长期竞争力(3)由才德兼具的人士 prospects, (3) operated by honest and competent people, 所经营(4)吸引人的价格，我们从来不 and (4) available at a very attractive price. We 试着去买进一些短期股价预期有所表 ordinarily make no attempt to buy equities for 现的股票，事实上，如果其企业的表 anticipated favorable stock price behavior in the short 现符合我们的预期，我们反而希望他 term. In fact, if their business experience continues 们的股价不要太高，如此我们才有机 to satisfy us, we welcome lower market prices of stocks 会以更理想的价格买进更多的股权。 we own as an opportunity to acquire even more of a good thing at a better price. Our experience has been that pro-rata portions of truly 我们过去的经验显示，一家好公司部 outstanding businesses sometimes sell in the securities 份所有权的价格，常常要比协议谈判 markets at very large discounts from the prices they 买下整家要来得便宜许多，也因此想 would command in negotiated transactions involving 要拥有价廉物美的企业所有权，直接 entire companies. Consequently, bargains in business 购并的方式往往不可得，还不如透过 ownership, which simply are not available directly 间接拥有股权的方式来达到目的，当 through corporate acquisition, can be obtained 价格合理，我们很愿意在某些特定的 indirectly through stock ownership. When prices are 公司身上持有大量的股权，这样做不 appropriate, we are willing to take very large positions 是为了要取得控制权，也不是为了将 in selected companies, not with any intention of taking 来再转卖出或是进行购并，而是期望 control and not foreseeing sell-out or merger, but with 企业本身能有好的表现，进而转化成 the expectation that excellent business results by 企业长期的价值以及丰厚的股利收 corporations will translate over the long term into 入，不论是少数股权或是多数股权皆

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correspondingly excellent market value and dividend	是如此。
results for owners, minority as well as majority.
Such investments initially may have negligible impact on our operating earnings. For example, we invested $10.9 million in Capital Cities Communications during 1977. Earnings attributable to the shares we purchased totaled about $1.3 million last year. But only the cash dividend, which currently provides $40,000 annually, is reflected in our operating earnings figure. Capital Cities possesses both extraordinary properties and extraordinary management. And these management skills extend equally to operations and employment of corporate capital. To purchase, directly, properties such as Capital Cities owns would cost in the area of twice our cost of purchase via the stock market, and direct ownership would offer no important advantages to us. While control would give us the opportunity - and the responsibility - to manage operations and corporate resources, we would not be able to provide management in either of those respects equal to that now in place. In effect, we can obtain a better management result through non-control than control. This is an unorthodox view, but one we believe to be sound.	这类的投资初期对于我们的经营利益 的助益或许不大，举例来说，1977 年 我们投资了1,090 万美元在资本城通 讯公司之上，去年依照持股比例应可 分得的盈余约为130 万美元，但实在 反应在我们财务报表上的却只有区区 4 万美元的现金股利。 资本城拥有优良的资产与优异的管理 阶层，而这些管理技能同样也延伸至 营运面及资金管理面，想要直接买下 资本城所要花费的成本可能是两倍于 间接透过股票市场投资，更何况直接 拥有权对我们并没有多大的好处，控 制权虽然让我们拥有机会，但同样也 带来责任去管理企业的营运及资源， 我们根本就没有能力提供现有管理阶 层关于这些方面额外任何的助益，事 实上，与其管还不如不管，更能得到 好的结果，这样的观念或许很反常， 但却是我们认为比较合适的。
Banking In 1977 the Illinois National Bank continued to achieve a rate of earnings on assets about three times that of most large banks. As usual, this record was achieved while the bank paid maximum rates to savers and maintained an asset position combining low risk and exceptional liquidity. Gene Abegg formed the bank in 1931 with $250,000. In its first full year of operation, earnings amounted to $8,782. Since that time, no new capital has been contributed to the bank; on the contrary, since our purchase in 1969, dividends of $20 million have been paid. Earnings in 1977 amounted to $3.6 million, more than achieved by many banks two or three times its size.	银行业 1977 年伊利诺国家银行的资产报酬 率约为其它规模较大同业的三倍，一 如往常，这样的成绩，还搭配给予存 户最优惠的利率，同时维持风险最低 流动性最高的资产组合，Gene Abegg 在1931年以25万美元成立这家银行， 在第一个完整的营业年度，盈余就达 到8,782 美元，从那时候开始，银行 就没有再办理任何一次增资，相反地， 当我们在1969 年买下该公司时，马上 就领到了2,000 万美元的现金股利， 1977 年的盈余更达到360 万美元，甚 至比规模大他两三倍的银行同业还 多
Late last year Gene, now 80 and still running a banking operation without peer, asked that a successor be brought in. Accordingly, Peter Jeffrey, formerly President and Chief Executive Officer of American National Bank of Omaha, has joined the Illinois National Bank effective March 1st as President and Chief	。 去年现年80 岁依然一马当先专注于 银行营运的Gene，要求新的接任者接 手，因此前奥玛哈美国国家银行的总 裁Peter Jeffrey 于3/1 正式加入伊 利诺国家银行担任新总裁。

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Executive Officer.
Gene continues in good health as Chairman. We expect a continued successful operation at Rockford’s leading bank.	老当益壮的Gene 依然担任董事长，我 们预期该银行仍将成为Rockford 地 区首区一指的银行 (伊利诺州城市)。
Blue Chip Stamps	蓝筹邮票
We again increased our equity interest in Blue Chip Stamps, and owned approximately 36 1/2% at the end of 1977. Blue Chip had a fine year, earning approximately $12.9 million from operations and, in addition, had realized securities gains of $4.1 million.	我们再度增加对蓝筹邮票的持股权 益，截至1977 年底，持有的股权比例 大约是36.5%，蓝筹邮票去年的表现 相当不错，营业利益达到1,290 万美 元，此外还有410 万的已实现资本利 得。
Both Wesco Financial Corp., an 80% owned subsidiary of Blue Chip Stamps, managed by Louis Vincenti, and See’s Candies, a 99% owned subsidiary, managed by Chuck Huggins, made good progress in 1977. Since See’s was purchased by Blue Chip Stamps at the beginning of 1972, pre-tax operating earnings have grown from $4.2 million to $12.6 million with little additional capital investment. See’s achieved this record while operating in an industry experiencing practically no unit growth. Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. may obtain the annual report of Blue Chip Stamps by requesting it from Mr. Robert H. Bird, Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040.	蓝筹邮票持有80%股权的Wesco 金融 公司(由Louis Vincenti所管理)及持 有99%股权的子公司喜斯糖果(由 Chuck Huggins 所管理)在1977 年都 有重大进展，自从喜斯糖果在1972 年被蓝筹邮票所买下后，就没有挹注 任何额外的资本，其税前盈余从420 万美元成长到1,260 万美元，尤其难 得的是喜斯所处的产业环境，几乎没 有成长，若有需要伯克希尔的股东可 向Mr. Robert(地址加州洛杉矶5801 South Eastern Avenue)索取蓝筹邮票 的年报。

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巴菲特致股东的信 1978 年 Buffett’s Letters To Berkshire Shareholders 1978 First, a few words about accounting. The merger 首先，是会计相关的议题，在年底与 with Diversified Retailing Company, Inc. at 多元零售公司的合并后，对于公司的 yearend adds two new complications in the 财务报表有两项影响，首先在合并案 presentation of our financial results. After the 完成后，我们对蓝筹邮票的持股比例 merger, our ownership of Blue Chip Stamps 将提高至58%左右，意味着该公司的 increased to approximately 58% and, therefore, 资产负债以及盈余数字必须全部纳到 the accounts of that company must be fully 伯克希尔的报表之内，在此之前，我 consolidated in the Balance Sheet and Statement 们仅透过权益法按投资比例认列蓝筹 of Earnings presentation of Berkshire. In 邮票的净值与收益。 previous reports, our share of the net earnings only of Blue Chip had been included as a single item on Berkshire’s Statement of Earnings, and there had been a similar one-line inclusion on our Balance Sheet of our share of their net assets. This full consolidation of sales, expenses, 如此全面性地将营收、费用、应收帐 receivables, inventories, debt, etc. produces an 款、存货及负债等科目合并，所产生 aggregation of figures from many diverse 的数字将来自于各种产业特性截然不 businesses - textiles, insurance, candy, 同的行业，包含纺织、保险、糖果、 newspapers, trading stamps - with dramatically 报纸及邮票等，某些行业各位的持有 different economic characteristics. In some of 的权益是100%，某些例如由蓝筹邮票 these your ownership is 100% but, in those 所持有的却只有58%(至于其它股东 businesses which are owned by Blue Chip but fully 所代表的权益，则列在资产负债表右 consolidated, your ownership as a Berkshire 半边负债科目的少数股东权益项下)， shareholder is only 58%. (Ownership by others of 对于财务报表这样的归类，我们认为 the balance of these businesses is accounted for 非但无法解释实际现况反而模糊了真 by the large minority interest item on the 正的焦点，事实上，我们内部从来就 liability side of the Balance Sheet.) Such a 不使用这样的报表进行分析管理。 grouping of Balance Sheet and Earnings items - some wholly owned, some partly owned - tends to obscure economic reality more than illuminate it. In fact, it represents a form of presentation that we never prepare for internal use during the year and which is of no value to us in any management activities. For that reason, throughout the report we provide 基于这样的理由，在接下来的报告中， much separate financial information and 我们将针对个别的行业提供各自的财 commentary on the various segments of the 务数字及分析检讨，以协助各位评估 business to help you evaluate Berkshire’s 伯克希尔实际的表现及前景，这些信 performance and prospects. Much of this 息大都是证管会信息揭露的相关要 segmented information is mandated by SEC 求，详见29 页到34 页的管理阶层讨

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